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ABSTRACT
This paper explores potential realization of gains by hospitals that are managed on a day-
to-day basis by external organizations under formal contracts.  It draws from the incentives
literature, which postulates that managers of firms where ownership is separated from control will
employ an input mix that deviates from cost minimization.  While this status applies to hospitals
generally, we hypothesize that specialized managerial expertise, coupled with the threat of non-
renewal, will improve efficiency in hospitals that opt for contract.  Secondary data obtained from
the AHA Annual Surveys (1991-1998) are applied to examine the distribution of ‘expense
preference’ parameters for all contract management adopters both pre- and post-adoption.  These
are contrasted with two control groups of hospitals drawn from the same years using propensity
score methods.  Results reveal allocative inefficiency among both adoption and control groups
but a significantly lower change in the expense preference parameter pre- and post-adoption
associated with a staffing.  This suggests that changes in incentive contracts are one important
strategy hospitals are using to cope with competitive pressures. 
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While there is considerable literature on the impact of managed care and networking in U.S. 
hospitals, other profound organizational changes affecting the industry have been largely 
overlooked.  In particular, the last two decades have seen a dramatic growth in “contract-
management” arrangements; to the point where nearly 20 percent of U.S. acute care hospitals 
now fall within this category (see Figure 1).  Under this arrangement an independent firm is 
contracted to provide day-to-day management services in lieu of a salaried CEO.  This 
organizational form may be viewed as occupying an intermediate position between system 
acquisition in which ownership is relinquished entirely and that of the freestanding hospital that 
maintains full administrative and operational control.  These hospitals venture to attain the 
management, administrative, and operational benefits of the more tightly integrated system 
hospitals while retaining the advantages of organizational autonomy.  Specialized managerial 
expertise, coupled with the threat of non-renewal, are expected to improve efficiency in hospitals 
that opt for contracts.  Despite the importance of this phenomenon, there is a paucity of evidence 
on the efficiency gains from contract adoption.  
In this study we attempt to fill the gap by tracking changes in performance of adopters 
and non-adopters over time.  To derive an empirical test, we turn to the incentives literature, 
which postulates that managers of firms where ownership is separate from control will employ 
an input mix that deviates from cost minimization.  While separation of ownership from control 
applies in both our cases, we hypothesize that allocation of inputs to the production process will 
be adhere more closely to cost-minimizing behavior under contracted managers.  Our test is a 
generalization of the method found in Mester (1989), whereby an ‘expense preference’ 
parameter associated with one of the firm’s inputs enters its cost function in a highly non-linear   2
fashion.  Unlike Mester, we allow this parameter to vary across inputs, after deriving an 
appropriate functional form. We derive a system of non-linear equations that consists of the cost 
function and the input demand functions for labor and capital, broadly defined, and estimate 
them jointly by method of non-linear seemingly unrelated regressions.  Our model is more robust 
than an earlier generalization due to Dor et al. (1997) since we further impose constraints on the 
expense preference parameters that are consistent with linear homogeneity. It offers an 
alternative to panel data estimations of hospital cost functions that identify managerial disparities 
through hospital effects which confound them with other factors such as quality of care and 
unmeasured case severity (Carey, 1997). Moreover, our quasi-experimental sample design 
allows us to explicitly test for the stability of the expense preference parameter over time.  
We hypothesize that hospital behavior under management contract will reveal a more 
efficient allocation of inputs to the hospital production process.  Contract management has 
continued to grow, and so have external constraints and accountability facing the hospital 
industry.  Better understanding of the behavior of this form of structural reorganization is an 





Institutional contract management involves the daily running of the hospital by an external 
organization under formal contract.  The managing organization reports directly to the board of 
trustees or owners of the hospital, which retains ownership of assets as well as legal rights and 
responsibilities.  The management firm supplies an administrator and often a management team 
as well as other support services that may provide marketing, recruitment, strategic planning,   3
legal, and/or financial expertise.  Contract management in the hospital industry is dominated by a 
handful of large firms, some of which manage dozens of hospitals at any given time (Scott, 
1994).  Institutional contract management is not limited to the hospital industry.  In the realm of 
education, recent interest has appeared in the management of public schools by for-profits and 
entrepreneurship is growing among education companies.  In the 1997-1998 school year, 
approximately 60 publicly funded elementary and secondary schools were run by for-profit 
firms.       
Prior literature has been anecdotal or descriptive, involving small samples only. Rundall 
and Lambert (1984) and Alexander and Rundall (1985) looked at matched samples before and 
after adoption, and reported lower proportions of expenses due to payroll in public hospitals 
under contract management. Wheeler and Zuckerman (1984) studied pre- and post-adoption 
samples for 21 contract-managed hospitals.  They found a reduction in number of employees per 
occupied bed in the post-test sample, as well as reduction in the variability of this measure, 
suggesting enhanced control over staffing patterns as well as improved organizational stability.  
Together these studies at least suggest that labor should be treated as a ‘preferred’ input by less 
efficient managers.  Other descriptive studies suggested that efficiency gains from contract 
adoption might be more general.  For instance Dor (1994) found lower expenses per admission, 
per bed, and per FTE following contract adoption in the late 1980s.  One reason cited was the 
importance of efficiency from a financial standpoint for the purpose of gaining access to 
managed care contracts.   
However these latter studies lacked a comparison group again making it difficult to rule 
out the possibility that some historical event other than adoption itself was responsible for the 
change.  A more comprehensive work that accounted for paired comparisons both pre- and post-  4
adoption is that of Kralewski, Dowd, Pitt, and Biggs (1984).  This study showed no difference in 
changes in staffing ratios or payroll expenses between the two groups.  It did show improved 
financial health related to markups of services by contract managers but no evidence of 
efficiency improvement following from decreases in expenses. Thus to date, the evidence 
remains inconclusive. 
To derive a more complete test we build from the incentives literature, which postulates 
that when ownership of the firm is removed from control, managers may not be driven by profit 
maximization.  Rather they may be motivated to maximize utility, and consequently have a 
positive preference for expenditures on items such as more staff and higher managerial wages.  
While separation of ownership from control applies to hospitals in general, we hypothesize that 
allocation of inputs to the production process will be more efficient under contracted 
management arrangements rather than under conventional salaried administrators.  
The issue of separation of management and control of the firm has been examined more 
widely in the empirical literature, where results have been mixed.  Edwards (1977) developed an 
early ‘intercept’ test for expense preference tied to specific inputs.  He found that salaried 
managers opted for higher expenditures on labor compared with manager-owners.  Hannan and 
Mavinga (1980) applied this test to other institutional settings in the banking industry, and found 
similar results.  Awh and Primeaux (1985) developed a model applicable to the electric utility 
industry; their results provided evidence contrary to expense preference.  Blair and Placone 
(1988) and Mester (1989) tested the hypothesis in the savings and loan industry, and found no 
evidence of expense preference behavior in mutuals, compared with lending institutions with 
shareholders who are presumed to exercise tighter control of management. However, Mester’s 
study represented a major methodological shift from the earlier body of work, as she was critical   5
of the notion that preferences could be revealed from an intercept term in the firm’s input 
demand function.  She suggested that preferences would permeate the production process as a 
whole. Thus, she derived a more general test in which an input-specific inefficiency parameter 
appears as a highly nonlinear argument in the firm’s cost function.  As with Edward’s original 
work, she associated expense preference behavior with labor demand.  Dor, Duffy, and Wong 
(1997) provide a further generalization of Mester’s model, whereby the firms’ cost function is 
estimated jointly with the demand function for the input hypothesized to be preferred.  While 
their model did not yet develop the full set of constraints appropriate for the system of non-linear 
equations, it demonstrated that results could change quite dramatically depending upon the 
particular input being studied. 
 In this study, we rectify the constraints problem, and present more robust estimation.  
We again use the setting of contract management, but for a more recent and longer time-series 
than previously considered.  We further expand earlier work by incorporating all contract-
managed hospitals and contrasting them with a comparison group of hospitals that never 
adopted, but have the same longitudinal distribution.  Moreover, the current sample design 
allows us to explicitly test for the stability of the inefficiency parameter over time.  Finally, in 
recognition of the notion that hospitals do not enter randomly into contract management, we use 





In this section we detail the development of our empirical test of input-specific inefficiency.  Let 
C* = cost under cost-minimization, and 
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i W is the market determined input price for the i’th input, and  *
i X  is the level of input i 
if cost-minimization is satisfied. For convenience we will assume that there is only one preferred 
input, which managers may choose to allocate inefficiently. Let  *
i X  denote the preferred input, 
using the operator * ) 1 ( j j j X z X + =  to denote deviations from the optimal level
1; substituting 
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Where C and  j S  are the observed costs and input share, and  j z  is an inefficiency parameter to 
be estimated. A number of observations can be made. First, from [1] and [2] it is immediately 
obvious that the following condition applies 
* *, , 0 C C and S S then z If j j j = = =  
Evaluating the limits of equation [2] we get  
                                                 
1 Note that this is simply the parameterization of the more general result  *
j X j X ≥ .   The profit maximizing 
firm will set inputs such that P · MPj,.  For the utility maximizer such that U=U(π, Xj) where π is profit, 

















The first condition states that if zj=0, i.e. no expense preference occurs, then the observed cost 
and the observed input shares are equal to their respective optimal values.  The second condition 
states that if expense preference is ‘absolute’, i.e., approaches infinity, then the preferred input 
becomes the only input in the cost function.  Further note that as the share of the preferred input 
increases, the share of the alternative input k necessarily declines. Evaluating the limits for the 
relevant preference parameter zk implies that it can take on small negative values, up to the cut 
off points zk > -1.  We will refer to preference parameters at that range as ‘non-preference’ 
values
2.  While   * C ,  *
j S  and consequently the z’s are unobservable to the researcher, it is 
possible to parameterize these in terms of existing variables using well-known functional forms
3.   
A general form is given by the translog cost function: 
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2  It can easily be shown that the same boundary condition,  -1 ≤  z < ∞, applies to multiple inputs (n>2), 
for any zi , provided that one of the preferred inputs approaches infinity faster than other inputs. A special 
case arises when all zi move at the same rate. In this case, for any input we have  j S  =  *
j S , but C >  * C .  
Since all relative shares remain the same, this can be interpreted to mean that allocative inefficiency may 
not occur.  At the same time, since all inputs are equally overused, technical inefficiency occurs, with 
total costs exceeding the least cost optimum.  
 
3 This is akin to multiple cause-multiple indicator models.  See Van Vliet and Van Praag (1987).   8
where Y = output and  i w  is the factor price of the i’th input.  By Shephard’s lemma, the share of 
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Equations [3] and [4] can be estimated jointly by method of seemingly unrelated regression (e.g., 
Berndt and Christensen, 1973).  Note that with multiple inputs, equation [4] can itself be 
regarded as a vector of equations. In any event, one input share equation is omitted from the 
estimation since  C Si ∑ = .    
Substituting these into equation [1] and equation [2]            
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Equations [3’] and [4’] present a constrained optimization problem. The translog cost function 
and corresponding input share are nested within this problem. Thus the usual constraints of linear   9
homogeneity and homotheticity apply (see Table 1). Combining the limiting cases from [1] and 
[2] we have the further constraint that z > -1. 
An important observation is that equation [3’] is virtually identical to the model presented 
in Mester [1989].  However, Mester did not consider the relationship between the cost function 
and input share equations in this highly non-linear setting.  From an examination of [3’] and [4’] 
it is immediately obvious that the zs are determined simultaneously by these equations.  
Estimates can be obtained by the method of iterative seemingly unrelated non-linear regressions.  
Gallant (1987) has shown that this method is equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation.  
Note that in the 2 input case [3’] and [4’] are greatly simplified when one zj  is estimated each 
time, as would necessarily be the case when only two inputs are considered.  This is summarized 
in Table 1. 
 
Data and Sample Design 
 
The majority of data for this study come from the American Hospital Association (AHA) 
Annual Survey Database for the years 1991-1998.  The dependent variable is total hospital 
expenses.  The AHA data isolates labor costs but not capital costs
4.  This allows us to incorporate 
two inputs into the models: labor and non-labor
5.  While input prices are not available directly 
from the data, we constructed measures of these by dividing labor costs by full-time equivalent 
employees and non-labor costs by the number of facility beds.  Output is measured as adjusted 
inpatient days.  The patient variable is the number of inpatient admissions with outpatient 
                                                 
4 Labor costs are defined as the sum of total facility payroll expenses and total facility employee benefits.  
Unfortunately the survey does not provide a breakdown of expenses by type of labor, so that this category covers 
registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, and administrative staff. 
5 Capital expenditures are a small part of the residual input.  Depreciation plus interest accounted for eight percent of 
total expenses in 1993, the latest year for which the AHA data reported on capital expenditures.  Labor costs made 
up 54 percent of the total for 1993.   10
services transformed into inpatient unit equivalents using a known formula and loaded onto 
inpatient variables
6.  We did this in order to fully account for the hospitals’ output, while keeping 
the specification as parsimonious as possible to ensure model convergence.  In order to control 
for product heterogeneity, we entered the Medicare diagnosis related group (DRG) case-mix 
index obtained from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (formerly Health Care 
Financing Administration) public use files.  Average length of stay is also entered to control for 
variation in output not captured by the adjusted patient days and case mix variables.  Finally, we 
include three binary variables that have been shown to explain cost variation among hospitals 
and/or by which adopters appear to differ from non-adopters: rural location, government control, 
and nonprofit status.  Descriptive statistics are listed in Table 2.  All financial variables are 
converted to 1998 dollars.    
Our methods involve examining expense preference behavior for contract managed 
hospitals and comparing them to those with conventional management structures.  To that effect, 
we created four hospital samples.  Two contain contract-managed hospitals.  The first of these 
includes data on hospitals for the year falling two years before they first reported being contract-
managed (pre-contract sample).  The second contains information for the year coming two years 
following first reporting, allowing the hypothesized behavior of contract-adopting hospitals a 
period of adjustment (post-contract sample).  Because results of models estimated on these 
samples are conditional on hospitals that eventually adopted contract management, we also 
created two control groups of hospitals that never reported being contract-managed, 
corresponding to the same time periods (pre-control and post-control samples).   
                                                 
6 The AHA adjusted discharges variable is the product of discharges and the ratio of total revenue to inpatient 
revenue.   11
One thousand three hundred and sixty-five hospitals reported being contract-managed 
during one or more of the years 1991-1998.  Since the sample design calls for information on 
pre-contract hospitals for two years prior to the adoption year, that sample includes those 278 
hospitals that adopted contract management during the period 1993-1998, for which a full set of 
data was available.  Hence the pre-contract sample spans the years 1991-1996.  The post-contract 
sample contains data for the 215 hospitals whose apparent adoption year was between 1992 and 
1996 and for which all data elements were non-missing.  The post-contract sample represents the 
years 1994-1998, or two years following adoption.  One hundred and fifty-eight hospitals appear 
in both samples.  Because specialty hospitals produce different services and have distinct 
technologies, the four samples were limited to nonfederal hospitals classified as general medical 
and surgical. 
For the pre-control and post-control groups, we chose random samples without 
replacement of non-adopters numbering three times the numbers of adopters.  Because the 
sampling strategy involves drawing all hospitals that adopted contract management, and because 
those hospitals differ in profile from internally managed hospitals, the drawing of a simple 
random sample was unlikely to produce a good match.  More specifically, as seen below, a 
relatively high proportion of contract-managed hospitals are rural.  These hospitals are also more 
likely to be government-affiliated hospitals, less likely to be not-for-profit, are lower in case-mix 
index, and have longer lengths of stay. 
In order to account for these various differences, we used propensity scores to reduce bias 
in the comparisons.  Propensity score methods are commonly used in observational studies in 
which the experimental unit of interest lacks the benefits of randomization.  Consequently, the 
‘treatment’ group and the randomized control group may differ systematically across a number   12
of covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984; D’Agostino 1998; Imbens 2000).  The propensity 
score, defined here as the conditional probability of adopting contract management, can be used 
to balance the distribution of covariates between the contract and control groups.  Because the 
propensity score is a scalar function of the covariates, it overcomes a significant drawback to 
standard techniques of adjustment through stratification, which can use only a limited number of 
covariates in the adjustment.  By summarizing information into a scalar, stratification on it alone 





The full set of parameter values for the model including the labor input equation is 
reported in Table 3.  The estimation procedure incorporated two empirical themes.  First, we 
attempted to look at the effect of contract adoption on hospital efficiency. To this end, we obtain 
separate estimates of the input-specific preference parameter in the pre-contract and post-
contract period, for hospitals that ultimately ended up adopting contracts.  Second, we aim to 
verify that the findings were not related to technological changes that occurred over time, 
independently of contract adoption.  We therefore repeat the estimation for a matched control 
group with an identical longitudinal distribution, and compare the inefficiency parameter in the 
simulated ‘pre’ and ‘post’ periods.  In addition, we implemented the same estimation strategy for 
the non-labor input.  Parameter estimates were similar, with the important exception of the 
preference parameters, which by construction must take on smaller values.  To avoid 
redundancy, we do not present the full set of results here.  Rather we summarize the results for 
all the  tj z  parameters in Table 4.  All of the regression models were estimated by method of 
non-linear iterative seemingly unrelated regressions (non-linear ITSUR).  Start values were   13
obtained from linear ITSUR models in which the parameter ztj is set to zero.  All models took 14 
to 16 interactions to converge. 
It is immediately apparent from an examination of Table 3 that labor is a preferred input, 
with all ztj > 0.  For contract adopters the values of this parameter fell from 0.98 in the pre-
contract period to 0.71 in the post-contract period, indicating a reduction in labor-specific 
inefficiency due to adoption of the contract.  The results become even more pronounced in 
comparison with the matched control group.  For this group, z rises from 0.54 in the pre-period 
to 1.13 in the post-period.  Thus in the absence of contract adoption the degree of inefficiency 
would have actually increased over the same time span
7. 
Table 4 summarizes these results as well as results for the inefficiency parameters of the 
residual input. The latter set of estimates were always negative, but within the permissible range.  
The table further demonstrates that when there is a decrease (increase) in the value of 
inefficiency for the ‘preferred’ input, there is a concomitant decrease (increase) in the value of 
‘non-preference’ for the residual input.  The interpretation of these results should be treated with 
caution. These results pertain to a summation of non-labor inputs categories that could not be 
identified in the data, due to changes in the AHA survey in the 1990’s.  It is possible that for 
some specific activities subsumed into this category positive values would have been found for 
corresponding inefficiency parameters. For instance, capital investments, known anecdotally to 
comprise about 7-8 percent of total spending in U.S. hospitals, is a likely ‘preferred’ input. The 
                                                 
7 The notion that excess staffing occurs in hospitals has also appeared in related literature (e.g. Mobley and 
Magnussen, 2002).  Recently the trade literature has begun to focus on the problem of nurse ‘shortage’ in hospitals, 
suggesting that hospitals tend to under employ nurses (Green and Nordhaus-Bike, 1997). However this concern is 
limited to certain high-end specialties of registered nurses, and does not seem to apply to licensed practical nurses, 
nurse-aides and the like.  Moreover, even for registered nurses as a whole the national trend has been that of 
increased employment in hospitals during most of the period observed in our data (Buerhaus and Staiger, 1999).    14
significance Table 4 is in demonstrating how our estimation procedure conforms to the boundary 
conditions defined in the previous section.  
We next investigate the significance of the difference in z between contract managed 
hospitals pre- and post-adoption controlling for extraneous historical factors.  This task is 
complicated by the large number of hospitals that are common to both the pre-contract and post-
contract samples.  While the contract-managed and control groups are entirely distinct, there are 
158 hospitals that appear in both the pre-contract and post-contract samples and 299 hospitals in 
both the pre-control and post-control samples.  We are unable to apply the two-sample t-test for 
the difference in parameters across regressions due to unknown covariances among the pre- and 
post-parameter estimates. 
As an alternative strategy, we solve [4’] for zj (in the case of one preferred input) yielding 
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where h indexes the hospital. Calculation of [5] yields the distribution of hospital specific values 
of z. Our interest lies in the equation for which labor is the preferred input.  Table 5 describes z 
for this model.  To facilitate comparisons across regressions, the hospitals common to both the 
pre-contract and post-contract samples and to the pre-control and post-control samples are 
separated, producing 158 and 299 matched pairs of hospital specific zs, respectively.   
We wish to evaluate the significance of a ‘management’ effect, or whether z differs for 
contract-managed hospitals between pre- and post-adoption years, after netting out a trend effect.  
For the hospitals represented in panel A, the first step in this evaluation is calculation of the 
changes in the zs for each set of matched pairs.  The result of the paired t-test performed on the   15
change in z before and after contract adoption, appears in column (1) of Table 6.  The average 
difference, -0.28, is significant.  Since z represents inefficiency, this suggests an efficiency gain 
for these hospitals.  Next, the second column shows that applying the paired t test to the 
difference in z for the control groups results in a highly significant average difference of 0.58, 
indicative of a decrease in efficiency.  The third column compares the difference in the changes 
in the means by application of the two-sample t test to the two sets of changes in z.  Under the 
assumption of unequal variances, the difference of  –0.96 is, not surprisingly, highly significant.  
This final result provides strong evidence of the existence of a ‘management’ effect in which 
contract adoption results in improved efficiency after controlling for other factors affecting 
hospital efficiency over time. 
In the case of the hospitals contained in the independent samples of Panel B, the 
‘management’ effect can be expressed as 
)] ( ) [( 00 10 01 11 µ µ µ µ − − − = ∆         [ 6 ]  
or the difference in z between pre- and post-adoption minus trend.  In order to test the 
significance of this effect, a two way analysis of variance is performed on binary variables M (1 
= contract management; 0 = control), P (1 = post period; 0 = pre-period) and interaction  P M *  
according to the following regression: 
ε β β β β + + + + = P M P M z * 3 2 1 0 .         [ 7 ]  
The management effect, which is equivalent to  00 10 01 11 µ µ µ µ + − − , can then be expressed as 
  3 0 2 0 1 0 3 2 1 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( β β β β β β β β β β = + + − + − + + + .     [8] 
This demonstrates that the significance of the management effect turns on  3 β , or the coefficient 
on interaction  P M * .  Table 7 displays the regression results of equation [7].  The highly 
significant negative term on the interaction effect points once again to the finding that netting out   16
the trend effect, the decrease in inefficiency for contract adopting hospitals is highly significant.  
While a less powerful assessment than the case of matched pairs, analysis of the independent 
samples still offers strong support for the hypothesis of improved efficiency associated with 





In this study, we develop a general estimator of input-specific inefficiency that is well 
suited for settings in which there are varying degrees of separation of ownership and control.  
Unlike previous studies, which focused on either the cost function of the firm or on its input 
demand functions, our approach is to estimate the two types of functions jointly.  This imposes 
added structure, allowing the highly non-linear estimator to converge quickly and efficiently.  
Moreover, our analysis demonstrates that the degree of inefficiency depends critically on the 
particular input suspected of being ‘preferred’.  In our particular setting of adoption of contract 
management arrangements, there is an added longitudinal dimension to the problem, since contract 
adoptions occur in different years.  To address this we create a matched control group of non-
adopters with the same longitudinal distribution.   
Turning to our results for U.S. hospitals, we find that labor is consistently a preferred 
input.  However, preference for labor declines significantly after the adoption of a contract.  In 
comparison, there is a marked increase in labor-specific inefficiency for non-adopters during the 
same ‘simulated’ period.  At the very least it can be stated that contract-managed hospitals did 
not experience the increase in labor-specific inefficiency that occurred elsewhere in the industry.  
Combined, these results suggest that contract-management firms are indeed able to introduce 
efficiencies over conventional, salaried managers.  These results have implications for other   17
service industries as well, particularly education, where contract management arrangements are 
becoming more prevalent.  It would appear that third-party contracts are a way by which boards 
of predominantly non-profit institutions can impose greater market discipline on the institutions 
they govern.  
As for the particular setting of hospitals, our results also pose new questions regarding 
the process by which contract-managers capture efficiency gains.  In particular, with the data 
available to us we were unable to separate out specific activities such as capital investment from 
the residual ‘non-labor’ expense category.  To gain a better understanding of this process, it will 
be useful to focus on more narrowly defined services that are at managerial discretion albeit at a 
more descriptive level.  We leave this to future research.  Nevertheless, the example of contract-
management provided a useful application for our model, whereby a robust inefficiency 
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Table 1.  Parameter Restrictions in Empirical Model 
 





  Independent Variables (moments) (cross-equation  restrictions 
follow immediately from the 
table) 
α 0  Constant --   
α 1  lnY --   
α 2  lnY * lnY  --   
β 1  lnW1 constant   
β 2  lnW2 --  β 1+β 2 = 1 
β 11  lnW1 * lnW1 2*lnW1  
β 22  lnW2 * lnW2  lnW2  
β 12  lnW1 * lnW2  --  β 11+β 22+β 12 = 0 
γ 1  lnY * lnW1  lnY  
γ 2  lnY * lnW2  --  γ 1+γ 2 = 0 
Hedonic 
Descriptors 
    
δ 1  CMI --   
δ 2  LOS --   
δ 3  RURAL --   
δ 4  GOV --   
δ 5  NPROF --   
      
  z z  -1 ≤  z  ≤ +∞  
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Table 2.   Descriptive Statistics: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) 
 Variables in Regression Models   
 
Contract   Control Group   
Variable 
 
Definition  Pre Post Pre Post 
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RURAL  Binary indicator of rural 
status (= 1 if rural; 









GOV  Binary indicator of 
local government 
ownership of hospital 










NPROF  Binary indicator of 
nonprofit status (= 1 if 









        
N    278 215 834 645 
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Table 3.  ln(cost) , Share 1: Nonlinear ITSUR Regressions
 a 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 Contract  Adopters 






b  Pre Post Pre Post 
α 0  Constant     5.016*** 
(0.9981) 
    1.987 
(1.4951) 
   3.614*** 
(0.4791) 
   4.978*** 
(0.7254) 
α 1  lnY    -0.857*** 
(0.2075) 
   -0.253 
(0.3107) 




α 2  lnY * lnY     0.079*** 
(0.0107) 
     0.046*** 
(0.016) 
   0.065*** 
(0.0050) 
   0.077*** 
(0.0076) 




    0.110 
(0.0706) 
    -0.004 
(0.0786) 
β 2  lnW2     0.952*** 
(0.1125) 
   0.727*** 
(0.1385) 
    0.890*** 
(0.0706) 
   0.996*** 
(0.0786) 
β 11  lnW1 * lnW1     0.053*** 
(0.0060) 
     0.049*** 
(0.007) 
   0.055*** 
(0.0039) 
   0.054*** 
(0.0042) 
β 22  lnW2 * lnW2     0.020*** 
(0.0058) 
   0.028*** 
(0.0068) 
   0.022*** 
(0.0035) 
   0.011*** 
(0.0040) 
β 12  lnW1 * lnW2    -0.073*** 
(0.0057) 
  -0.077*** 
(0.0067) 
  -0.077*** 
(0.0034) 
  -0.065*** 
(0.0041) 
γ 1  lnY * lnW1      0.004 
(0.0031) 
   -0.002 
(0.0036) 
   0.005*** 
(0.0017) 
   -0.001 
(0.0021) 
γ 2  lnY * lnW2     -0.004 
(0.0031) 
    0.002 
(0.0036) 
  -0.005*** 
(0.0017) 
    0.001 
(0.0021) 
δ 1  CMI     0.733*** 
(0.1147) 
   0.942*** 
(0.1752) 
   0.743*** 
(0.0631) 
   0.809*** 
(0.0793) 
δ 2  LOS    -0.007*** 
(0.0010) 
  -0.005*** 
(0.0013) 
  -0.008*** 
(0.0005) 
  -0.004*** 
(0.0005) 
δ 3  RURAL    -0.091** 
(0.040) 
   -0.099* 
(0.0544) 
   -0.088*** 
(0.022) 
  -0.156*** 
(0.0243) 
δ 4  GOV     -0.099* 
(0.0586) 




   -0.110** 
(0.0441) 
δ 5  NPROF     -0.055 
(0.0566) 




   -0.102** 
(0.0425) 




   0.544*** 
(0.0997) 
   1.129*** 
(0.1961) 
       
Adj. R
2 (ln cost)        0.962      0.927      0.969      0.952 
Adj. R
2 (share1)       0.441      0.452      0.404      0.376 
a Models omit the capital share equation (share2); 
b Variable labels and coefficients are reported as specified in the cost function; 
* 0.05 < p-value ≤ 0.1; 
** 0.01 < p-value ≤  0.05; 
*** p-value ≤  0.01.   22
 
 Table  4 
 
Values of Parameter ztj 
  Contract Adopters  Control Group 
Labor    
pre      0.977*** 
          (0.255) 
    0.544*** 
          (0.131) 
post              0.709** 
          (0.298) 
   1.129*** 
         (0.245) 
Residual    
pre    -0.682*** 
          (0.072) 
  -0.469*** 
         (0.056) 
post     -0.611*** 
          (0.125) 
  -0.643*** 
         (0.049) 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** 0.01 < p-value ≤  0.05; 
*** p-value ≤  0.01 
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Table 5.  Values of z:  Labor input case 
                                                       PANEL A:                  PANEL B: 
                                            matched pairs              independent samples 





03 . 1 01 = µ  
466 . 01 = σ  
N = 158 
 
619 . 00 = µ  
344 . 00 = σ  
N = 299 
 
03 . 1 01 = µ  
464 . 01 = σ  
N = 120 
 
578 . 00 = µ  
540 . 00 = σ  






788 . 11 = µ  
436 . 11 = σ  
N = 158 
 
20 . 1 10 = µ  
480 . 10 = σ  
N = 299 
 
669 . 11 = µ  
279 . 11 = σ  
N = 57 
 
18 . 1 10 = µ  
595 . 10 = σ  
N = 346   24
Table 6.  Comparison of Values of z (matched pairs):  labor input case 
 
 





















a  The differences in means were calculated by subtracting pre-adoption values from post- 
   adoption  values.  Significance of the difference was determined via the paired t-test. 
 
b  The difference in the changes in the means was calculated by subtracting the comparison group  
   mean from the contract adopter mean.  Significance of the difference was determined using the     
   two sample t-test. 
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Table 7.  Regression Results for z (independent samples):  labor input case 
 
 
Variable Parameter  Estimate  t-value 
Intercept .578  24.7 
Management .455  8.34 
Time .606  16.3 
Management * Time  -.970                       -10.3 
    
R
2 = .2140 
N = 1058 
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Appendix:  Propensity Scores Calculation 
 
Propensity scores, or conditional probabilities of adopting contract management, were 
estimated for each hospital using logistic regression.  We performed two regressions 
corresponding to the ‘pre’ and ‘post’ groups.  The first regression included all available 
observations for the adoption years 1993-1998 and the second included those for adoption years 
1992-1996.  We incorporated all variables used to explain variation in cost as covariates in the 
logit regression.  Table A1 shows the results of these regressions.  Some interesting results 
emerge.  What matters in the distinction of contract adopters is ownership form and locality.  
Contract management is on the order of two times as likely to be found among hospitals with 
government control, non-profit status, or rural location.    
Using calculated propensity scores based on the regression results, stratification 
proceeded by dividing the propensity scores into quintiles.  In practice, stratum boundaries can 
be based either on the propensity scores from the entire merged sample or else from the adoption 
group alone.  Following D’Agostino (1998), we based the stratum boundaries on quintiles of the 
estimated propensity scores from the combined groups.   
Stratification also took into account the distribution of the contract-managed hospitals 
over time.  The control groups were finally drawn randomly within propensity score quintile-
year cells.  We produced two control groups each containing three times the number of contract 
adopters that matched the adopter groups’ distributions by propensity score quintile and year.  
Table A2 shows the propensity score distributions.      27












































.929 -.735 .480 
Average 
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Table A2.  Propensity score distributions by quintile 
     Pre-contract         Post-contract 
Quintile1          13              3 
Quintile2          36           20 
Quintile3          33           38 
Quintile4          75           69 
Quintile5        121          85  
 Total        278         215 
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